There have been many meetings in recent years on "Brain and C om puter" topics under a number of different aspects. Although it is not my own field of experim ental work, I have been discussing this subject with brain-and com puter scientists, ro boticists, psychologists, and scholars of the hum an ities for several years (Stieve, 1995) . The confer ences about mind and brain which I attended or read about were often characterized by a lack of true discussion, i.e. disputation of differing argu ments, and did not seem to have an impact on on going research. People presented their data, find ings and opinions in monologues without seriously discussing their grounding and the reasons for the disagreements with others. This was especially so in the those fields in which consciousness and feel ings are involved, e.g. the question whether a com puter can have feelings. In many cases convictions were mixed with confirmed facts, and plausibility or wide acceptance was taken as proof. Compared to conferences in biophysics and biochemistry this is quite a contrast.
Therefore I felt there is now -after the first wave of these "Brain and Com puter" confer ences -even more need for interdisciplinary dis cussion in certain parts of this field. I tried to as semble a group of people from neurobiology, com puter science, robotics and philosophy for a serious discussion. With this aim I pursued the following strategy:
I contacted more than 50 people from the vari ous fields concerned and received very useful ad vice. I only want to mention a few of them who were especially helpful. Peter Bieri, Berlin, Tobias Bonhoeffer, München, Valentin Braitenberg, Tü-A t first I tried to organize a one year research group at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld. But this seemed not to work. Later I became convinced that an intense workshop would be a better frame for such a dis cussion.
For such a workshop it seemed necessary to • Select topics which need and deserve interdisci plinary discussion and where such discussion promises to yield results, because there are many very interesting topics in this field where discussion does not promise results now.
• Choose a framework which ensures a successful discussion. I chose the Dahlem Workshop Con cept with which I already had some positive ex perience. A conference of the Dahlem type had never been held at the ZiF in Bielefeld. This appeared to be quite a challenging opportunity to dem on strate at the same time the efficiency of this con cept. On the other hand, the directors of the ZiF were not easily convinced that this concept would work. For scholars of humanities a conference which is so different from a sequence of mono logues and from the standard workshops of the ZiF may be difficult to accept. All the more, we wish to thank the ZiF which after some hesitation decided to house and support for the first time a Dahlem-type conference, our workshop. We also wish to thank the staff of the ZiF, especially M a rina Hoffmann, Andreas Lueking, and Daniela Mietz, and its managing director Dr. Gerhard Sprenger, and last, but not least Bettina Halbe, a student of the RWTH Aachen, for their sensitive, effective and friendly help in preparing and con ducting our workshop.
The Concept of the Workshop
The concept of the Dahlem Conferences is a concept for an unusual -but to my mind very efficient -type of workshop. This Concept has its emphasis on the discussion of the meaning of new and old observations, models, and theories and aims to encourage new cooperations and the de sign of new critical experiments.
This concept includes some "tricks": • Small discussion groups which design their own agendas. This allows effective discussions in which each m em ber of the group can partici pate. The jointly designed agenda allows to find room for the topics which the members find worth discussing and brings the responsibility to the participants.
• No lectures at the workshop, but background papers distributed in advance. Lectures tend to be monologoues and could kill the path of the discussion. Background papers distributed in advance allow the members to prepare them selves to the discussion. • Joint group reports which are published right after the workshop with all the members of a discussion group as the authors. This is an essen tial requirem ent because it forces the group to reach conclusions during the limited time avail able for discussion, and (since every m em ber is a co-author) every m em ber of the group has to agree on what is written down. The task to finish a group report implies that everybody tries to stay focused during the group discussion.
• A "Program Advisory C om m ittee" consisting of representatives of the various disciplines rele vant for the them e of the workshop. It proposes the topics and the participants of the workshop and their roles as m oderators, rapporteurs and authors of background papers. The Committee met in Bielefeld in the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) on April 14 and 15, 1996 -almost two years before the work shop -selected the topics for the four discussion groups, chose a name for the workshop, and sug gested the participants to be invited and their roles in the workshop.
The Preparation of the Workshop
The date of workshop, 8 -1 2 March, 1998 was chosen to fit to the possibilities of the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld and to be outside the teaching periods of G erm an uni versities. However, this is the time of many other meetings and in addition it is during the teaching periods of universities in some other countries. O ur time window happened to include the 70th birthday of the designer and founder of the D ah lem Conferences, the late Silke Bernhard, to whose memory the conference is dedicated.
With our program we closely followed the welltested time schedule of the Dahlem-workshops, with one exception: we made it one day shorter. It turned out that it probably would have been better not to reduce it.
The participants: As the num ber of participants of the workshop should not exceed about 40, only a small number of the persons interested and com petent in the concerned fields could be invited. We tried to assemble a variety of participants includ ing younger and older, who were prepared to co operate, could supply interesting contributions, were able to listen with an open mind, and would commit themselves for the entire duration. Not all who were invited could participate, but those who did come made up for these losses by working hard, inventively, and cooperatively.
The multidisciplinarity of the workshop partici pants may be dem onstrated by the following. N or mally, a participant personally knows about seventy or even eighty percent of the participants already before coming to a workshop. In ours, most partici pants had not met at least two third of the others.
O ur aim, then, was to have an efficient discussion between workers in neurobiology, robotics, infor matics (com puter science), and philosophy (epistemology) in comparing certain properties of brains and com puters of organisms and robots. Whereas the interdisciplinary exchange of views between com puter people and brain researchers has already begun a few years ago, the inclusion of epistemologists seems an innovation. To make such different people talk to each other in an understanding way (patiently listening and exchanging arguments) is no easy venture. We hoped that the Dahlem con cept would make this possible.
The topics: The suggested topics for the four dis cussion groups of our workshop were chosen be cause the Program Advisory Committee thought that they deserved an open-minded interdiscipli nary discussion and were likely to lead to interest ing results: 1. R epresentation of the environment in natural and artificial systems. How is the inform ation about the properties of the environm ent represented in the brain to en sure the generation of appropriate behavioral actions? Examples: The representation of space, m otor action and faces in brains and in the anal ogous control "organs" of robots. 2. Functional advantages of organisms with brains in evolution. The functional consequences of certain brain properties for the behavioral fitness of organ isms. Examples: brains of birds and insects as instrum ents to cope with ecological pressures, the evolution of robots' capacity to cope with ecological pressures, and the significance of the brain as a learning machine for success in evolu tion. 3. The behavior of natural and artificial systems:
solutions to functional demands. Comparing perform ances of systems with func tional demands, including questions like behav ioral decisions in conflicting situations. Sug gested examples: How molluscs decide on taste preferences, recognition of optical objects in natural and artificial systems, resource alloca tion in distributed technical networks, and walk ing robots.
4. Em ergent properties of natural and artificial systems. The term "em ergence" has become fashionable. It is used with quite different meanings by brain researchers, mathematicians, and philosophers. It seemed to be useful to understand the dif ferent definitions in which the term is used, try to find a definition of emergence which is useful for our purposes, describe supposed emergent phenom ena in brains and computers and to dis cuss how far we today understand their origin. Suggested topics were non-linear mechanisms in brains and computers, brains as generators of emerging faculties, and the so-called binding phenom enon, i.e. the adequate handling of dis tributed brain activities which correspond to dif ferent properties of the same object. It was suggested by the Program Advisory Comittee that the discussions at the workshop should focus on the comparison of properties of brains and computers with an emphasis on the functional dependence of brains on their natural "bodies" and of computers in robots on their connected ma chineries. The significance of this interdependence for the behavior of an organism has only gradually become clear during the past few years. Com par ing those properties of brains and computers which affect the behavior of organisms and robots helps to understand both better. Most of today's robots are still relatively rigidly program med to fulfill certain well-defined tasks in a straightfor ward "if -then" manner. There is, however, a de velopment of more advanced robots which can make more autonom ous decisions to be used e.g. in emergencies or on Mars. These may allow even more interesting comparisons to living organisms.
We know of relevant properties of computers which cannot be achieved by brains (e.g. speed of processing). A re there relevant properties of brains (accessible to natural science) which cannot be achieved by computers, now or ever?
Limitations: Natural science is limited to objec tively observable phenom ena, in other words, to consider only phenom ena which are accessible to independent observers is a conditio sine qua non for "clean" natural science (Stieve, 1998: this issue, pp. 445-454) . This confinement has certain prag matical advantages: The scientific experim ent is the acid test which decides whether an assumption or a theory can survive or has to be discarded.
Humanities do not have this independent judge. Therefore many old theories cannot conclusively be discarded (e.g. those of the ancient Greeks). They may be recycled over and over, according to the "Zeitgeist". By contrast, in natural science many theories (some of them brilliant) have been falsified and discarded by the force of critical ex periments.
This limitation sets boundaries to pure natural scientific brain research. It excludes consciousness and feelings as possible objects of research since these are only subjectively accessible and alterna tives cannot be decided objectively. If beliefs and convictions come into play, this makes a discussion very difficult, if not impossible. W hether com put ers can have feelings, be creative or have intuitions like a human m athem atician are questions of be lief; they can not be scientifically decided.
O ther brain problems which can not be solved today, may be solved in the future. O ur present conjectures or assumptions may be right or wrong. An example is the historical controversy about the signal conduction in nerves: In the twenties and thirties of this century there was a vigorous con troversy whether signal conduction in nerves is "electrical" or "chemical" (see e.g. Muralt, 1946) . Both sides had powerful advocates. Finally, this controversy was solved experimentally in the late forties and fifties (see Hodgkin, 1951) . Those 1920s scientists whose theories em erged as true had not had the better arguments, but better intu ition and possibly more luck. Guessing the right answer is not in the end sufficient for the progress of our scientific understanding, but designing and making the critical experiments is, and even a wrong theory may lead to it. O f course, to look at the available data in the right way, which involves sensitive guesswork, intuition, and even aesthetics, is very im portant for designing good theories and im portant experiments.
For our understanding of brains and computers there may be problem s involved which are insolu ble in principle. Gödel has shown that there are cer tain mathematical problem s which can not be solved: "All consistent axiomatic formulations of num ber theory include undecidable propositions" (Gödel, K. (1931 (Gödel, K. ( ), quoted after H ofstadter (1979 ). Similarly, the so-called 'strong em ergence' is de fined as the occurrence of a novel phenom enon which cannot be explained on the basis of the un 442 derlying structures and may play a part in brain function (see Stephan, 1998: this issue, pp. 639-656 and Walter, 1998: this issue, pp. 723-737) . How ever, since today there is no clue to determ ine whether such a problem is unsolvable (e.g. whether a phenom enon is strongly emergent), the only suc cessful strategy for brain research is to try to solve the riddles at hand until we know more about them.
Our Program Advisory Committee suggested that topics which today are unlikely to lead to much progress (e.g. the mind-body problem ) must not occupy much of the group's activities, but the arguments for the current stalem ate situation should be stated in the discussion group report. It seemed, however, desirable to come to a joint statem ent on what the participants agree and where and why they disagree.
How Was Our Workshop?
O ur groups worked in a self-organizing m anner after the m oderator and rapporteur and main topic had been determ ined by the Program Advi sory Comitee. They found their own agenda and way to handle their tasks. They acted somewhat like organisms. Sadly, our workshop was hit by un foreseeable losses. A part from the usual drop-outs, an infectious flu deprived us of several im portant participants. As they had been carefully chosen to be part of our small number, this was a hard blow. But this is the beauty of organisms, they can com pensate for losses. If a shore crab (Carcinus) loses one or two legs it can adapt its way of walking in a way that beautifully compensates for the missing limbs. And our discussion groups did exactly the same thing. They compensated for the missing members synergetically and did a com plete job by modifying the suggested topics according to the expertise present. Actually the groups discussed the following: G roup 1: Representation in natural and artificial systems:
The concept of representation was in the focus of the discussion in this group. Examples can be found in descriptions of the visual system, the m o tor system, as well as in central systems like the hippocampus. Although the description of neuro nal activity is often phrased in terms of representa tions, the concept is less well understood and has several implications which have to be considered.
Firstly, the relevant aspect of neuronal activity establishing a representation is subject to an in tense debate -some researchers favor the mean activity of neurons as the relevant signal conveyed to other neurons, while others emphasize the pre cise tem poral structure of neuronal activity. Thus, estimates of what is represented in a particular structure are dependent on the assumptions made on the relevant variables and might be different for an outside observer and other brain structures.
Secondly, the concept of neuronal representa tions is often used in a passive sense. The emphasis is placed on recreating properties of the external environm ent as faithfully as possible. Thus, the in teraction with neuronal structures upstream and downstream have traditionally been assumed to occur in a feed-forward manner.
Thirdly, representations are not static entities but have to form during development and learn ing. This poses the questions of maintenance of representations, of the interaction of new experi ences with previous ones already stored, and poses the problem of grounding a representation in the real world.
For these three aspects this group considered it timely to investigate the concept of neuronal rep resentations within several fields of neuroscience research. Exploiting the broad range of expertise of their members, the group undertook to investi gate the concept of neuronal representations from as many aspects as possible. In the group report a series of examples is presented in a comparative fashion. For each example an attempt is made to identify the relevant variables, the nature of the interaction with upstream and downstream struc tures and the influence of training and develop ment. By this careful analysis of neuronal repre sentations in different contexts a more precise and consistent use of this concept might be possible.
The most outstanding result was the common alty in a num ber of principles of representation that were common to all of these examples. The im portance of the interaction of organisms with their environm ents was observed in each of the systems studied.
Group 2: Influence of brain and com puter design on the perform ance of natural and artificial organisms:
The discussions were focused on the relations between structures (the materialistic im plem enta tion at the level of molecules, subcellular organ elles, neurones, and networks) and functions de fined teleologically for brains and com puters (on a variety of different levels of explanation). Exam ples of evolutionary achievements in natural or ganisms were com pared with the advancements of com puter and robot design that improve their per formance. Pivotal points of the discussions were the role of algorithms for the functioning of brains and computers, their em bodyment in the internal architecture of natural brains and artifacts, the im plem entation of plasticity, and some possible limitations for the perform ance of computers, e.g. in the field of creativity.
Group 3: The behavior of natural and artificial systems: solutions to functional demands: Natural organisms have different strategies for the adaptation to their environment. For example there is a great variety of eye types in natural or ganisms adapted to a certain environm ent and dif ferent tasks. The discussion group tried to focus on the similarities between natural and artificial systems and the benefits for the different fields of research. At the m om ent it is common sense that both fields could profit from each other, but the m ajor problem is to give concrete examples for successful interactions and to raise new and inter esting questions. The examples discussed ranged from sensory inform ation processing to m otor be havior, and some speakers gave nice examples of artificial systems incorporating biologically moti vated strategies in sensory-motor integration. But these examples showed clearly that the develop m ent of a theory of the m otivational system is a demanding task with a lot of unresolved problems both in natural and artificial systems.
The role of models, their usefulness and limita tions, for brain and com puter research was also discussed in this group.
Group 4: Em ergent properties of natural and artificial systems:
The discussion of this group focused on the phe nomenon "em ergence". Due to the complexity of natural systems and the limitations of the related theoretical approaches to their properties, the term emergence originally was mainly used to la bel certain properties as somehow appearing from some underlying structures. As it became more and more technical, the need increased to relate this term to other theoretical approaches and to discuss it in term s which can be reduced to observ able phenom ena. Thus, suggesting that all observ able phenom ena can be reduced to a consistent set of underlying scientific laws, at least in principle, would imply that emergence has no intrinsically methodological significance as a technical term. On the other hand, the term emergence would play a significant role under the assumption that there exist properties that in principle are not reducable. The related question about the princi pally reducibility of systems phenom ena is truely at the very border of science and appears to be impossible to answer.
As a practicable avenue, the term emergence was discussed in the frame of pattern formation, especially in the context of neurobiology. It turned out that pattern formation may provide a methological and conceptual frame to discuss empirical findings in the fields of neurobiology and behav ioral sciences on a rigid mathem atical ground while opening clearly shaped ways to different but related fields.
In this group it took a m ajor effort on the se cond day to resolve some initial m isunderstand ings between brain and com puter scientists on the one hand, and philosophers on the other. But this paved the ground to an interdisciplinary discussion which apparently was satisfactory to all the mem bers of the group.
